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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION OF ENEMY
CoMBATANT AFTER CESSATION OF HosTILITIEs-ScoPE OF INQUIRY IN
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS-Petitioner, the Commanding General of the
Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine
Islands, surrendered to and became a prisoner of war of the United States Army
Forces in Baguio, Philippine Islands on September 3, 1945. By order of respondent, petitioner was served, on September 25, with a charge setting forth
a violation of the law of war.1 On October 8 petitioner, after pleading not
guilty to the charge, was held for trial before a military commission of five

1 The charge stated: "Tomoyuki Yamashita, General Imperial Japanese Army,
between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and other places in the
Philippine Islands, while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty
as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United
States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he, General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, thereby violated the laws of war."
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Army officers appointed by General Styer, and a bill of particulars was filed by
the prosecution specifying sixty..:four items. On October 29, the day of commencement of trial, a supplemental bill of particulars was filed, containing fiftynine additional specifications, a copy of which had been given to the defense
, three days earlier. On December 7, the commission pronounced petitioner guilty
and sentenced him to death by hanging. Appeal was made to the Supreme Court
of the United States for leave_ to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and
prohibition, and also a petition for certiorari to review an order of the Supreme
Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines denying petitioner's application
to that court for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition. Petitioner claimed that
his detention for trial by the military commission was without lawful authority
or jurisdiction and raised the following questions: (I) whether the military
commission was lawfully created, and whether such a tribunal could be convened after the cessation of hostilities to try him for a violation of the law of
war; ( 2) whether the charge, that as commander he had failed to control the
troops under his command by permitting them to commit atrocities, in fact stated
a violation of the law of war; (3) whether he was denied a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because the order governing the procedure of the commission, which authorized the admission of
certain types of evidence, was contrary to the Articles of War which prescribe
the procedure before military tribunals, ~nd violated the provisions of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, which stipulate that a prisoner of war shall be entitled
to trial by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of
persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power; and (4) whether
the commission was without jurisdiction because of the failure to give advance
notice of his trial to the neutral power representing the interests of Japan as a
belligerent, as required by the Geneva Convention of 1929. Held, both petitions
denied, since it appeared that "the order convening the commission was a lawful order, that the commission was lawfully constituted, that petitioner was
charged with a violation of the law of war, and that the commission had authority to proceed with the trial, and in doing so did not violate any military, statutory or constitutional ground" (Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissenting).
Application of Yamashita, and Yamashita v. Styer, Comma1l(ling General, U.S.
Army Forces, Western Pacific, (U.S. 1945) 66 S.Ct. 340.2
•
The entire court agreed that Congressional action in sanctioning creation
of military commissions, appointed by military command, to try and to punish
enemy combatants for violations of the law of war was valid; 3 also, that Con2 With the same division of justices, this case was authority for denying similar
petitions by General Homma after his conviction, Homma v. Styer, (U.S. 1946) 66
S. Ct. 515.
3 41 Stat. L. 787 at 790, 794, 796, 804 (1920); IO U.S.C. (1940) § 1471 at
§§ 1486, 1509, 1517, 1553, 1554; Articles of War 15, 38, 46, 81, 82; United States
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. IO; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND
PRECEDENTS, 2d ed., 831 et seq. (1920). For a general history of the development
of the military commission see WINTHROP at 831, 835; II Op. Atty. Gen. 297 at 300
(1869); BASIC FIELD MANUAL FM 27-5, Military Government § 5; Ballantine,
"Unconstitutiona,l Claims of Military Authority," 24 YALE L.J. 189 at 205 (1915);,
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gress had incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of such commissions, all of the offenses against the law of war, although it had not codified nor
-defined those offenses precisely.4 Beyond that point the majority and minority
split sharply on practically every issue. 5 Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the
majority, pointed out the sharp restrictions which have traditionally hedged in
the inquiry which a civil court may make into the proceedings and determinations of military tribunals, limiting any such review solely to the question of
whether the military court or commission was acting within its jurisdiction and
not volating any applicable statutes.6 Indeed,, the Chief Justice suggests that
even violations of statutes concerning procedure or the admissibility of evidence
may not be reviewable on petition for habeas corpus. 7 Having regard to this genStein, "Judicial Review of Determinations of Federal Military Tribunals," l l BROOKL. REv. 30 (1941); Miller, "Relation of Military to Civil and Administrative
Tribunals in Time of War," 7 OHIO ST. L.J. 188, 400 (1941); Cushman, "Ex Parte
Quirin Et Al-The Nazi Saboteur Case," 28 CoRN. L. Q. 54 (1942); Munson, "The
Arguments In the Saboteur Trial," 91 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 239 (1942); 56 HARV.
L. REv. 631 (1943); Glueck, "By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?"
56 HARV, L. REv. 1059 (1943), who states at 1065, note 17, that at that time the
War Department had no record of the trial by an American military commission of
a sipgle soldier for violating the laws and customs of war.
4 Especially Article of War 15 (see supra, note 3). For listings of some of the
breaches of the law of war see, I I Op. Atty. Gen. 297 at 299-300, 310 (1869); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I at 32, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942). On the sources and nature of
the law of war, see, WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENT, 2d. ed., 41, 42,
773 ff., 839 (1920); BASIC FIELD MANUAL FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare,
§ 347 (1940); various treaties and international agreements as listed in LACHS, WAR
CRIMES 5 (1945); DAVIS, MILITARY LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, 1st ed., 309, 310
(1898); Colby, "Courts-Martial and the Laws of War," 17 A.J. INT. L. 109 (1923);
Manner, "The Legal Nature a~d Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary
to the Laws of War," 37 A.J. INT. L. 407 (1943); Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment
of War Criminals," 31 CAL. L. REv. 530 (1943); TRAININ, HITLERITE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER CruMI~AL LAW (1945); Wright, ''War Criminals," 39 A.J. INT, L.
257 (1945).
G Justice Murphy's dissent ran to seven pages in the Supreme Court Reporter, and
Justice Rutledge's to twenty pages.
6 "If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn,
their action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong
decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts
but for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions."
Principal case at 344. Precedent in support of this point is overwhelming, Ex parte
Vallandingham, 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 243 (1863); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 21 S. Ct.
48 (1900); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942); 20 L.R.A. (N.S.)
413, note (1909); Stein, "Judicial Review of Determinations of Federal Military
Tribunals," II BROOKLYN L. REV, 30 (1941), and cases cited therein; Rose ex. rel.
Carter v. Roberts, (C.C.A. 2d, 1900) 99 F. 948; Covington, "Judicial Review of
Courts-Martial," 7 GEo WASH. L. REv. 503 (1939); Kaplan; "Constitutional Limitations on Trials by Military Commissions," 92 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 119 (1943),
id. at 272 (1944).
7 He states, id. at 351, "Nothing we have said is to be taken as indicating any
opinion on the question of .•• whether the action of a military tribunal in admitting
LYN
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eral rule, and in view of the nature of the proceedings before the comm1ss1on
which the Court accepted in this case, 8 it may be said that the decision stands
for the proposition that under practically no circumstances 9 will a civil court
interfere with the absolute freedom of discretion as to procedure and rules of
evidence granted to a legally constituted military commission acting within the
proper scope of its jurisdiction.10 This seems to be the case even if the commissjon departs in important particulars from the safeguards inherent in normal
judicial process. 11 On the other hand, the necessity of judicial protection of
civil liberty is not ignored in this case since the Court reiterates its contention
that no one, not even an active enemy combatant, may be deprived of his right
to make a defense, or to contest the authority of the officials trying him as conevidence, which Congress or controlling military command has directed to be excluded
may be drawn in question by petition for habeas corpus or prohibition." A few cases
have held that it may not, Ex parte Tucker, (D.C. Mass. 1913) 212 F. 569; Ex
parte Dickey, (D.C. Me. 1913) 204 F. 322; United States v. Maney, (C.C. Minn.
1894) 61 F. 140; In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, II S. Ct. 54 (1890); Kurtz v.
Moffit, 115 U.S. 487, 6 S. Ct. 148 (1895); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879);
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857). But compare Justice Murphy's statement
(principal case at 355) to the effect that he understands the scope of review recogniz 7d
by the Court to include the question of whether the commission, in admitting certain
evidence, had violated any controlling statute.
8 Justice Rutledge mentions the following discrepancies: denial of opportunity
to prepare defense in that the petitioner was given only three weeks to prepare a
defense to the bill of particulars and then was served with a supplemental bill of
particulars on the day the trial started, with no continuance granted; admission of
hearsay once or several times removed, relating to various incidents, rumors and reports; admission of opinion evidence and conclusions of guilt; accepting as sole proof
of certain specifications, ex parte affidavits; admission of "untrustworthy, unverified,
unauthenticated evidence which could not be probed by cro~-examination or other
means of testing credibility, probative value or authenticity." Principal case at 365.
9 Or maybe "under no circumstances."
However, the Chief Justice does say,
(principal case at 348), "There is no contention that the present charge, thus read,
is without support of evidence, or that the commission held petitioner responsible for
failing to take measures which were beyond his control or inappropriate for a commanding officer to take in the circumstances." Query, would the Court go beyond a
mere jurisdictional investigation in a more extreme case?
10 The question immediately presents itself as to whether this is simply a doctrine
of inter armas silent leges, applicable solely to military commissions trying persons for
violations of the law of war, or whether it is equally applicable to all military tribunals.
Even in the first mentioned situation does not the path indicated by the Quirin case,
i.e., trial of citizen and non-citizen civilians before a military commission in the
United States proper, point to a possible suspension of constitutional rights in a much
broader way?
11 Though not bound to the letter of Constitutional requirements, military courts
are said to be within its spirit. See Naval Court Martial Order No. 48, 1920, I CoMP.
OF CoURT MARTIAL ORDERS, 1916--1937 (1940), and citations therein. In general
on procedure, see MUNSON AND JAEGER, MILITARY LAW AND CouRT MARTIAL PROCEDURE (1941); lvEs, TREATISE ON MILITARY LAw 284 (1879); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS, 2d ed., 841 ff. (1920) ;- Glueck, "By What Tribunal
Shall War Offenders Be Tried?" 56 HARV. L. REv. 1059 at 1072 (1943).
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trary to the Constitution or laws of the United States.12 Apparently the Court
will inquire into any detention to see if the party is being wrongfully held by
military officials and subject only to a trial in a civil court. The commission's ·
jurisdiction as to time,13 place, person, and offense were carefully examined.
The first three elements were easily satisfied, but on the question whether the
offense constituted a violation of the law of war, Justice Stone was hard pushed
to reconcile the allegations with accepted principles of international law and to
find the requisite duty and power,14 to say nothing of knowledge and intention
which were not mentioned even once in his opinion. 15 In its comments on the
Articles of War, which partially prescribe the procedure for military courts and
12
Ex parte Kawata, 317 U.S. 69, 63 S. Ct. 115 (1942); In re Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942). Just how far the Court will go in recognizing constitutional
rights in enemy subjects is still open to question. The Kawato case relies heavily on
United States residency for its result, and neither the Quirin case nor the instant one
do more than make slight comments on petitioners' right "to contend that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial."
For the traditional view, that enemy aliens and prisoners of war have no rights or
privileges under municipal law, see Smith, "Martial Law and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus," 30 GEo. L. J. 697 (1942).
13
It is clear that military government and discipline may remain in effect until
an actual declaration of peace, BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GovERNMENT AND MARTIAL
LAW 361-369 (1914); WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 308, 309-312
(1910); United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 56 (1869); The Protector,
12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 700 (1871); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880);
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 41 S. Ct. 224 (1920); Treaty of Peace With Ger~
many (1919), 13 AM. J. INT. L. Supp, 151 at 250-251 (1919).
14
The limits of this note prevent any discussion of the possibility that the duty
was created ex post facto, a point which is basic not only in this case but also in the
Nuernberg Trials. This subject has recently received a great deal of attention. See
GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944); Kelsen,
supra, note 4, 31 CAL. L. REv. 530 (1943); TRArnrn, H1TLERITE RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER CRIMINAL LAw (1945); Wright, "War Criminals," 39 AM. J. INT. L. 257
(1945); Hyde, "Punishment of War Crimes," AM. Soc. OF INT. L. PROC. 39 (1943).
15
Apparently the majority of the Court visualizes an absolute responsibility on
the part of military commanders. Justice Rutledge forcefully states that there was a
"vagueness, if not vacuity'' in both the charge and the findings as to whether Yamashita's offense consisted in his inaction with actual knowledge, or in his negligent
failure to discover and take steps to prevent widespread atrocities. In this connection
it is interesting to note that the recommendations of the Committee of Responsibilities
for the prosecution of war criminals in World War I were specifically objected to
by the American and Japanese delegations because they proposed punishment for
negative criminality. The Japanese opposed "indicting ••• highly placed enemies on
the sole ground that they abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing
acts in violations of the laws and customs of war." V10LATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CusTOMS OF WAR-REPORTS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING REPORTS OF AMERICAN
AN"i> JAPANESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF RESPONSIBILITIES, CONFERENCE OF
PAms,~ 1919. See also GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Div. of International Law,
Pamphlet No. 32 (1944).

1
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specify certain types of admissible evidence, 16 the Court employs a strained construction to find them inapplicable. Its conclusion, while possibly historically
sound, is certainly novel.1 7 A similar approach is taken with regard, to the failure
of the commission to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention
relative to the rights of prisoners of war when they are arraigned for trial by
their captors.18 Only by the narrowest reasoning can the Court avoid saying
that the plain words of the agreement were violated. 19 The dissenting opinions
invoke the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as applicable to "any
person" without exception as to war crimes, and proceed to a careful examination of the procedural and evidentiary rulings of the commission in obvious
disregard of the general rule against, such review. 20 Justice Murphy frankly
proposes an expansion of the Court's right of iµquiry into the proceedings before
military tribunals, stating, 21 "judicial review available by habeas corpus must
16 Especially Article 25, which prohibits the reception of depositions by the prosecution in capital cases, and Article 38 which gives the President authority to prescribe
the procedure, including modes of proof, for all military tribunals, and directs him to
apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in criminal cases tried in civil courts.
17 Principal case at 349-350. The argument of the majority is that the Articles
of War are not meant to apply to military commissions when they are trying prisoners
of war. A somewhat similar view of the dual aspect of military commissions is taken
by Miller, "Relation of Military to Civil and Administrative Tribunals in Time of
War," 7 Omo ST. L.J. 188 at 193, note IO (1941).
18 Article 60, 47 Stat. L. 2051 (1929), states: "At the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the detaining Power shall advise the representative of the protecting Power [in this case; Switzerland] thereof as soon as possible, and always before the date set for the opening of the trial." Article 63, 47 Stat.
L. 2052 (1929), provides: "Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war
only by the same courts and according to the same 'procedure as in the case of persons
belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power."
19 It appears that the Chief Justice could have more easily avoided the problem by
attributing a forfeiture of all prisoner of war rights to Yamashita by virtue of his
primary status as a r,ar criminal. FLORY, PRISONERS OF W-AR (1942) states at 37: "It
is recognized in customary international law that persons otherwise entitled to the
status of prisoners of war may forfeit the right to such status by the commission of
certain acts as espionage, violation of parol, and war crimes."
20 Numerous difficulties appear when an attempt is made to apply the due process
clause to the facts of the principal case. In order to do so the following questions must
be answered in the affirmative: (1) Do non-resident enemy aliens have.any Constitutional rights? (See supra, note 12). (2) Are military tribunals of any sort subject to
the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment? In an older case the Supreme
Court stated that so far as those in the military service are concerned, military law is
due process, Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 31 S. Ct. 230 (19n). And certainly
an enemy soldier has no greater rights than a member of our own armed. forces. (3) Is
due process a proper subject of judicial review by way of a collateral attack through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus? If ( l) and ( 2) are accepted it follows that there
may be good ground for extending the scope of the court's scrutiny since the argument
basic to its denial in appeal from a civil court is missing, i.e., that other adequate remedies for a complete review are available. However, as noted before, precedent is
definitely to the contrary. ·
21 Principal case at 355.
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be wider than usual in order that proper standards of justice may be enforceable." 22 Justice Rutledge's lengthy dissent goes much further in reviewing not
only procedural defects, but even the sufficiency of the evidence. By applying
the Articles of War, the Geneva Conference, and the due process clause he has
no difficulty in concluding that the commission was without jurisdiction from
beginning to end. It is submitted that even within the proper limits of the scope
of review as spelled out by Chief Justice Stone, the Court without great difficulty
and with considerable justification, could have granted the petitions and required
a retrial because of fatal defects in the proceedings and in the charge as drawn.
In this manner it could have set a precedent which would require military
justice to show some semblance of due process. But to construe statutes so narrowly against the interest of a party on trial for his life, in the face of extremely
unusual legal procedures, when the entire prosecution is based on a somewhat
1
doubtful theory, is to admit that military tribunals may act in flagrant disregard
of our constitutional tradition. If war criminals are to be "tried," rather than
summarily condemned by political decision, is it not more consistent with the
notion of the supremacy of the "law of the land" to conduct the trials in accordance with at least the minimum requirements of fair procedure?

L. B. Brody, S.Ed.

22 Justice Murphy's dissent is devoted mainly to the substantive issue. He states
a lack of precedent for creating, and the non-existence of, a. duty as alleged; failure
to allege knowledge; and inability to prevent the offenses. To sustain the last mentioned item, Murphy relies on evidence of the tactical situation introduced by himself,
in direct opposition to Stone's comment that there was no contention that Yamashita
was being held responsible for measures which were beyond his control ( supra, note 9).

